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THREE DECADES OF FRUSTRATION: FINALLY,
A SOLUTION TO THE ASBESTOS PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
The explosion of asbestos personal injury suits filed in the United
States during the last three decades has overburdened many state
and federal courts.1 The American civil justice system has thus far
proven ill prepared to deal with the demands of such a multitude of
claimants, prompting many judges and scholars to call for a national
solution to the asbestos crisis.2 Although many attempts have been
made to resolve this growing problem through proposed legislative
action,3 none have garnered enough support to reach enactment.4
I See H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (finding that state and federal courts are strained
by more than 150,000 asbestos suits currently pending in those courts); see also Robert G.
Berger, The Inpact of Tort Law and Development on Insurance: The Availability/Affordability Crisis
and Its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 285 (1988) (comparing number of asbestos suits
and asbestos-related suits); Gregory A. Bibler, 77w Status of Unaccrued Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 145, 149 (1997) (analyzing toxic torts and asbestos
suits in bankruptcy courts). See generally Mark Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion,
46 MD. L. REv. 3, 24-25 (1986) (discussing massive increase in filings of asbestos suits); Jack B.
Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, Evidence and Procedure For the Future: The Effect of Equity on
Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 269, 322 (1995) (noting that in 1980's congress started to
respond to what had been pro-plaintiff legislation in order to deter or mitigate damage to
American business).
2 See Am. Law Inst., Complex Litigation Project, Various drafts (1987-1990) (discussing
asbestos crisis and its specific needs); see also Jeffrey S. Brenner, Alternatives to Litigation: Toxic
Torts and Alternative Dispute Resolution-A Proposed Solution to the Mass Tort Case, 20 RUTGERS
L.J. 779, 805-06 (1989) (recognizing arbitration or negotiation panels as solutions to asbestos
crisis); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure
Act, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1039, 1046 (1986) (examining federal mass-tort procedure act as best
approach for dealing with nationwide litigation crisis); Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary
Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 42 n.131 (1986)
(discussing selection of law clerks with scientific and technical backgrounds to assist work on
cases).
3 See, e.g., Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, 136 Cong. Rec. H 3137, Vol. 136 No. 69
(1990) (discussing needs of employees working in asbestos environments); Occupational
Disease Compensation Act of 1985, H.R. 3090, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (proposing
establishment of toxic injury program based on Workers' Compensation framework);
Asbestos Workers' Recovery Act, H.R. 1626, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985) (expanding original
jurisdiction of federal courts to include mass tort cases meeting given criteria).
4 But see Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990)
(modifying case management procedures in mass and complex litigation); George Ong,
Directors and Officers Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy: The Impact On An Estate and Its Claimants,
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With dockets continuing to swell across the country, it has
become clear that the current judicial framework for disposing of
these claims is simply too inefficient to dispense justice to all of the
parties involved. 5 The Supreme Court of the United States has
thrown up its hands in the face of the "elephantine mass of asbestos
cases"6 and shifted responsibility for resolving the growing problem
onto Congress.7 Congress has responded by proposing The Fairness
in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999 (FACA).8
The provisions of this act would create the Asbestos Resolution
Corporation 9 (ARC) whose primary function would be to establish
medical standards for evaluating asbestos related claims10 and to
facilitate settlement of individual claims through utilization of
various alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques.11 Under
the proposed statutory framework, all asbestos-related personal
injury claims not yet settled or adjudicated would be bound to this
13 BANK. DEV. J. 235 (1996) (citing Act to support objective of bankruptcy law and policy);
Judith R. Start, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction To Release Insiders From Creditor Claims in Corporate
Reorganizations, 9 BANK. DEv. J. 485 (discussing relations between Judicial Improvement Act
and Bankruptcy Code); Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1521, 1562 (1993) (discussing civil justice plans required by Judicial Improvements Act of
1990).
5 See H.R. 1283 at § 2 (stating that there are currently 150,000 pending asbestos suits in
state and federal courts); see also Emily Eadie, Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company v.
Michael Buckley, 24 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 609,614 (1998) (citing American Bar Association account
of number of asbestos suits); Francis E. McGovern, Issues In Civil Procedure: Advancing the
Dialogue, A Symposium: Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv. 659, 665 (1989)
(discussing increase in asbestos litigation); Michael Remez, Court Rejects Railroad Worker's Case
Law Denies Right to Sue for Damages Before Onset of Illness, THE HARTFORD COuvANT (Conn.),
Jun. 24, 1997, at A3 (stating enormous number of asbestos-related personal injuries currently
pending).
6 Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (quoting Justice Souter who observed that
asbestos litigation "defies customary judicial administration and calls for national legislation").
7 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997) ("The argument is
sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the
most secure, fair and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure."); see also
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So.2d 502, 505 (Fla. 1994) (declaring that uniform solution to
problem caused by asbestos litigation can only be effected by federal legislation); Ripa v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 660 A.2d 521, 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
(commending asbestos problem to legislature for imposition of more rational solution);
Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 196 (Ohio 1998) (stating that there is no problem
more in need of legislative solution than that of asbestos litigation).
8 See H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. (1999). See also S. 758, 106th Cong. (1999) (pending before the
Senate).
9 See H.R. 1283 at §§ 101-306 (establishing framework for corporation). But see, John Bell,
Asbestos Companies Try To Eliminate Their Liability, 35 TRIAL, May 10, 1999 (criticizing proposed
legislative effort to curb asbestos litigation through creation of Asbestos Resolution
Corporation).
10 See H.R. 1283 at §§ 201-206 (determining eligibility criteria for all asbestos-related
illnesses and employing various techniques for dispute resolution).
11 See H.R. 1283 at §§ 301-06 (providing framework for settlements through mediation
and arbitration).
ASBESTOS PROBLEM
mechanism.12
Under this legislation all asbestos cases would pass through the
Asbestos Resolution Corporation before being filed in the normal
judicial system.13 The Corporation's jurisdiction would apply to all
asbestos cases, pending or not, unless trial has already commenced
in the traditional court system.14 The legislation further provides
that a claimant must exhaust the mandatory ADR mechanisms
imposed by the Corporation before suit could be filed in the usual
way.15
This note will examine the Fairness in Asbestos Compensation
Act as a possible solution to the ongoing asbestos tragedy
continuing to claim victims nationwide. Part I of this note will
briefly discuss the development of the asbestos crisis through the
last three decades. Part II will illustrate the inadequacies of the
available judicial management techniques commonly applied in
asbestos cases. Part III will illustrate some of the failed efforts at
mass judicial resolution of asbestos claims through class action
mechanisms. Finally, part IV will present an argument in support of
this legislation as the most equitable solution to the asbestos crisis.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION
Asbestos has been used in the manufacturing of hundreds of
products found in dozens of American industries.16 Asbestos-
containing products in commercial and industrial settings have
exposed millions of Americans to the risks of asbestos-related health
problems.17  It was not until Congress passed the Federal
12 See H.R. 1283 at §§ 701, 702.
13 See H.R. 1283 at § 702.
14 See H.R. 1283 at § 701.
15 See H.R. 1283 at §§ 201-04.
16 See In re Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 736 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y
1991) (describing industrial uses for asbestos products); see also DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL.,
ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS TOXIC TORTS 1 (1985) (discussing common
uses of asbestos products); Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87
GEO. L.J. 1983, 1984 (1999) (comparing exposure from asbestos products and breast implants);
Richard A. Nagareda, Turning From Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1996)
(explaining effects of exposure to asbestos products).
17 See In re Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 736 (noting that estimates of
number of Americans exposed to significant amounts of asbestos are upwards of 21 million);
see also Deirdre A. McDonnell, Increased Risk of Disease Damages: Proportional Recovery as an
Alternative to the All or Nothing System Exemplified by Asbestos, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 623
(1997) (noting increased risk of serious disease based on asbestos cases); Steven L. Schultz, In
Re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and Backlogged - A Proposal For
the Use of Federal Common Law, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 553, 558-59 (1992) (discussing use of asbestos
2000]
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Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197018 that use of asbestos in
most industrial settings was prohibited.19 Those injured through
exposure to asbestos products initially found it difficult to obtain
relief in the courts.20
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.21 was the first successful
products-liability suit involving a claimant who had been exposed
to asbestos. 22 In Borel, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the plaintiff, who had been injured through exposure to asbestos
fibers, was entitled to compensation from 11 asbestos manufacturers
on a theory of strict liability.23 This case led to the steady increase of
asbestos related personal injury filings across the country.24
products in building, shipping and construction trades throughout America); John A.
Siliciano, Symposium: Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990 (1995)
(discussing increase in incidence of particular disease by mass exposure cases).
18 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
19 See Schultz, supra note 17, at 560 (discussing effect of passage of Federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass
Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1356 (1995) (citing Act in reference to restriction to
use of any products after 1970); Steven L. Humphreys, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the
Corporate Polluter As A Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 311 (1990) (discussing how
Act was enacted for purpose of ensuring safe working conditions); Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks
and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY L.J. 1, 136 (1993) (noting how Act did not
preempt state criminal prosecutions against defendants in industrial workplaces).
20 See In re Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 745 (noting problems faced
early on by asbestos claimants); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (defining mass future claim as claim
arising out of right to payment or equitable relief); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 203 B.R. 256, 262
(S.D. Ohio 1996) (providing trust adequacy with respect to future claims); Sheldon S. Toll,
Bankruptcy and Mass Torts: The Commission's Proposals, 5 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REV. 363, 364
(1997) (discussing how Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 provides equitable treatment for mass
future asbestos claimants in bankruptcy).
21 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
2- See Hensler & Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-legal
Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1003-05 (discussing impact of Borel on asbestos litigation); see
also Jack Berman, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: The Function of State of the Art
Evidence in Strict Products Liabilih, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 93, 100 (1984) (providing that Borel
established that asbestos producers knew of hazards posed by mineral); Michael D. Green, The
Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in
Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141, 171 (1984) (discussing cases relying on Borel and issue
of asbestos as unreasonable dangerous product); Robert Scott Lewis, Recent Decision: U.S. Ban
Corp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership: Settlement Condition on Vacatur, 47 ALA. L. REV.
883, 886 n.22 (1996) (noting Borel decision awarded damages of $58,534.04).
23 See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1103 (holding that "district court's judgment does no more than
hold defendants liable for foreseeable consequences of their own inaction"); see also Berman,
supra note 22, at 100 (providing analysis of Borel); Troyan A. Brennan, Collateral Estoppel in
Asbestos Litigation, 14 ENVTL. L. 197, 204 (1983) (discussing how Borel was instrumental in
allowing federal court to follow Restatement 2d of Torts § 402(a) in expanding accountability
of manufacturers on theory of strict products liability); Green, supra note 22, at 171 (discussing
effect of Borel judgment on subsequent asbestos personal injury cases); Hensler & Peterson,
supra note 22, at 1003-05 (discussing impact of Borel on asbestos litigation).
24 See Shultz, supra note 17, at 561 (stating that in eighteen years following Borel,
thousands of cases flooded federal and state judicial systems); see also Brennan, supra note 23,
at 204 n.45 (warning that rejection of collateral estoppel in asbestos cases may increase amount
of litigation); Susan Stevens Ford, Vho Will Compensate the Victims of Asbestos-Related Diseases?
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By 1991 there were as many as 100,000 individual asbestos
personal injury suits pending in federal and state courts across the
country.25  As a result, several asbestos-containing product
manufacturers have been forced into bankruptcy in an effort to cap
liability. 26 Additionally, there is now a real possibility that those
plaintiff's litigating first will strip manufacturers of all remaining
assets, leaving nothing to compensate future claimants who have
not yet developed an asbestos-related illness.27
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF CASE MANAGEMENT
Under the current civil justice system, plaintiffs can expect long
delays in the disposition of their cases.28 Federal Judicial Center
Manville's Chapter 11 Fuels the Fire, 14 ENVTL. L. 465, 469 (1984) (providing how increase in
litigation has made asbestos cases most common type of products liability lawsuit); James T.
0' Reilly, Risks of Assuimptions: Inpacts of Regulatony Label Warnings Upon Industrial Products
Liability, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 85, 86 (1987) (discussing how industrial products liability will
continue to increase).
25 See Order to Show Cause, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, No. 875 (1991);
Shultz, supra note 17, at 561 (indicating that some estimates put number of suits pending in
court system in neighborhood of 100,000); see also Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for
Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157, 175 (1998) (observing how Borel led to increasing
number of asbestos cases); Green, supra note 22, at 667 (noting that 50,000 is conservative
estimate of number of pending asbestos suits).
26 See H.R. 1283 at § 2 (1999) (stating that Congress has found that asbestos litigation has
led to bankruptcy of more than 15 companies who have manufactured asbestos-containing
products); see also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 45 B.R. 322 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (interpreting
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 to require asbestos trial in
district court); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (reporting
bankruptcy filing and cognizable claims in bankruptcy); In re Amatex, 37 B.R. 613 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1983) (concluding asbestos claimants are not creditors); Valle Simms Dutcher, Comment:
The Asbestos Dragon: The Ramifications of Creative Judicial Management of Asbestos Cases, 10 PACE
ENVrL. L. REV. 955, 956-57 (1993) (discussing results of bankruptcy filings on competitiveness
of American business); see, e.g., In re Forty-eight Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. 973 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1991) (discussing bankruptcy filing of Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc.).
27 See H.R. 1283 at § 2 (finding that current litigation system awards massive amounts to
few claimants while jeopardizing ability of future claimants to obtain compensation); see also
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1329 (5h Cir. 1985) (Clark, C.J., dissenting)
(voicing his concern that those who litigate first will exhaust all assets available to compensate
injured parties, leaving nothing to compensate future claimants). See generally Dutcher, supra
note 26, at 958 (stating that courts must be conscious of interests of future claimants or current
damage awards and costs will exhaust corporate assets of defendant companies); Arthur R.
Miller & Price Ainsworth, Symposium on Problems in Disposition of Mass Related Cases and
Proposals for Change: Resolving the Asbestos Personal-Injury Litigation Crisis, 10 REV. L1TIG. 419,
425 (1991) (recognizing danger of depleting assets available to compensate future claimants).
28 See Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, Report of the Ad
Hoc Committee (1991) (hereinafter Ad Hoc Committee) (stating that asbestos cases take an
inordinately long time to reach disposition); see also H.R. 1283 at § 2 (finding that "volume and
complexity of asbestos cases have resulted in the violation of basic tenet of American justice:
speedy and inexpensive resolution of cases"). See generally Dutcher, supra note 26, at 957
(discussing customary delays associated with asbestos suits); Hensler & Peterson, supra note
22, at 963 (discussing problems facing asbestos claimants in current judicial system).
2000]
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statistics demonstrate that as of 1989, the average asbestos personal
injury suit filed in federal court does not reach trial for nearly three
years.29 For many claimants, that is time they do not have.30
Similarly, the high costs of litigating asbestos suits drastically
reduce the eventual recovery received by the claimant.31 One study
demonstrated that for each dollar spent in connection with asbestos
litigation, claimants received approximately thirty-nine cents.32 In
addition to the pecuniary costs, valuable judicial resources are
wasted relitigating many of the same issues associated with asbestos
suits. 33 Courts can expect to hear the same evidence presented on
the issues of causation, liability and damages for each plaintiff.34
In an effort to preserve valuable time and judicial resources,
courts facing such a mass tort problem have employed extra-judicial
methods of case management.35 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide several such methods for aggregating cases,
including consolidation 36 and class action.37 Application of many of
29 See Federal Judicial Center, Asbestos Conference (June 25,1990).
30 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 759 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(noting that many asbestos claimants die awaiting trial); Dutcher, supra note 26, at 957 (1993)
(stating that many plaintiffs die of asbestos-related disease before reaching trial); see also
Schultz, supra note 17, at 562 (indicating that many asbestos victims will die before receiving
any compensation).
31 See Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 28 (recognizing that asbestos litigation has proven to
be extraordinarily costly); H.R. 1283 at § 2 (finding that attorney's fees and litigation costs
leave less than 50 percent of total cost of asbestos litigation to compensate daimants); see also
Schultz, supra note 17, at 562 (discussing high cost of asbestos litigation). See generally JAMES S.
KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION, COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 91 (1984)
(discussing high costs of asbestos litigation).
32 cee KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 31, at 91 (noting compensation for asbestos victims tends
to be very limited); see also In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 790 (indicating that
claimants receive about thirty-nine cents of every dollar spent on litigation); Schultz, supra
note 17, at 562 (asserting that claimants receive approximately thirty-nine cents out of every
litigation dollar).
33 See Ad Hoc Committee, snpra note 28 (noting that many of issues litigated in asbestos
suits have previously been litigated). See generally Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and
Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507 (1987) (discussing potential waste of judicial resources
from duplicative litigation).
34 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (stating that
courts hear much of same evidence replicated from case to case); Roger C. Cramton,
Symposium: Mass Torts: Serving Up Just Desserts: Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and
"Settlement Class Actions", 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 817 (1995) (discussing problems of retrying
same evidence in separate asbestos trials).
35 See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 738 (stating that use of mediation
in mass tort litigation was essential to proper function of judicial system); Jenkins v. Raymark
Industries, 782 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1986) (appointing special settlement master to gather
information from all parties to facilitate pre-trial discovery); see also Cramton, supra note 34, at
816 (discussing available extra-judicial management techniques for mass tort daim
resolution). See generally Schultz, supra note 17 (discussing currently available extra-judicial
management techniques for mass tort claim resolution).
36 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42 (allowing consolidation of cases pending in same court which
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these drastic measures, however, have forced judges to take on a
more active role in the case disposition process. 38
A. Federal Case Consolidation
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the
consolidation of cases filed in the federal court system in select
situations in order to preserve judicial resources.39 Under Rule 42(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal court may
consolidate all cases pending in that same district presenting
common questions of law or fact.40 Consolidation under this rule
allows courts to expedite the litigation process by collectively trying
the common issues in bifurcated or trifurcated trials before a few
juries rather than on an individual basis.41
Unfortunately, Rule 42(a) consolidation is limited to those cases
pending in the same federal district.42 In addition, consolidation of
present same issue of law or fact).
37 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (making special provisions for filing single suit on behalf of
multiple claimants where joinder of such parties would be impracticable).
38 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. at 653 (aggregating hundreds of asbestos
claims for adjudication in single three-phase trial); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611
F. Supp. 1396, 1450 (E.D.N.Y 1985) (utilizing special settlement master to bring parties
together in settlement negotiations). See generally Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 374 (1982).
39 See Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933) ("[C]onsolidation is
permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administration, but does not merge the
suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in
one suit parties in another."); Newfound Management Corp. v. Lewis, 131 F.3d 108, 116 (1997)
(noting that Supreme Court's holding in Johnson "remains the 'authoritative' statement on the
law of consolidation"); see also Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen Woods Kolodgy, Mass Exposure
Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 467, 503 (1985) (discussing
broad discretion of federal courts to consolidate multiple actions pending in single federal
district under Rule 42).
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) states:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it
may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the action; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Id.
41 See Amy Gibson, Cimino v. Raymark Industries: Propriety of Using Inferential Statistics and
Consolidated Trials to Establish Compensatory Damages for Mass Torts, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 463, 469-
71 (1994) (examining Judge Parker's creative use of aggregation of suits to resolve mass tort
claims); Francis E. McGovern, supra note 5, at 662 (discussing Judge Parker's creative use of
aggregation of claims to resolve mass asbestos litigation in Eastern District of Texas). See
generally Davis, supra note 25, at 180 (citing Cimino v. Raymark as landmark case due to Judge
Parker's efforts); Linda S. Mullenix, Article: Beyond Consolidation: Post Aggregative Procedure in
Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 475, 483 (1991) (analyzing consolidated
handling of mass tort litigation by Judge Parker).
42 See FED. R CIv. P. 42(a); see also Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 249
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (noting that Rule 42 does not permit consolidation of claims pending in other
federal districts); Anschell v. Sockheim, 145 F. Supp. 447, 451 (D.N.J. 1956) (stating that federal
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cases under this rule is further limited to only common issues of law
and fact.43 Thus, even after such consolidation, an individual trial
must still be held for each claimant on all unique issues.
Federal Courts may also seek consolidation of claims pending in
the federal system through The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation.44 Under this rule, all cases within the federal court
system presenting common issues may be transferred to a single
court for pretrial proceedings. 45 Such a transfer allows the recipient
court to concentrate its efforts on these consolidated matters.46 The
Judicial Panel has made efforts to resolve the growing asbestos crisis
through §1407 without much success.47
Use of this device, however, is limited only to those cases pending
in the federal court system 48 which share common issues of fact or
court jurisdiction in Rule 42 consolidations apply only to those cases pending in forum court's
judicial district).
43 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. King, 45 F.R.D. 519, 520
(W.D. Okla. 1968) (requiring presence of common questions of law or fact for consolidation
under Rule 42); Oliver v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 225 F. Supp. 536, 539 (E.D. La. 1963)
(stating that Rule 42 consolidation possible only where common questions of law or fact
present).
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is a judicial body
comprised of seven district and circuit judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States. Id. at § 1407(d).
45 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) states in part:
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in
different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for
such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote
the just and efficient conduct of such actions.
Id. See also hi re Photocopy Paper, 305 F. Supp. 60, 61 (.P.M.L. 1969) (stating that transfer and
consolidation under § 1407 would not be proper unless common issues of fact existed among
suits pending in different federal districts). See generally D. HERR, MULTIDISTRICr LITIGATION
7-17 (1986) (discussing utility of multidistrict consolidation).
46 See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 926, 1993 WL 199129, at
1 (J.P.M.L. May 4, 1993) (transferring all pending federal breast implant cases to single court
pursuant to § 1407); hi re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., No. VI, 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991)
(ordering transfer of 26,639 cases from 87 federal districts to Judge Weiner in Eastern District
of Pennsylvania for pre-trial proceedings pursuant to § 1407).
47 See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. No. VI, 771 F. Supp. at 424 (transferring all pending
federal court asbestos cases that were not yet on trial to Eastern District of Pennsylvania for
consolidated pretrial proceedings); see also Dutcher, supra note 26, at 972 (discussing efforts of
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to resolve asbestos crisis); Blake M. Rhodes, The
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1991)
(noting efforts to resolve asbestos cases by judicial panel).
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1900 (noting that transfer under § 1407 is appropriate
only where such transfer allows for economy and efficiency in administration of justice);
Schultz, supra note 17, at 591-93 (noting that transfer under § 1407 would have no effect on
thousands of asbestos suits pending in state courts); Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 1, at
296 (discussing limitations on use of transfer under § 1407). See generally Chesley & Kolodgy,
supra note 39, at 509 (discussing limitations on multi-district litigation consolidation pursuant
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law.49 Transfer under this rule is further limited because it may be
used for purposes of pretrial administration only,50 requiring that all
cases be remanded to the district court of their original filing once
the pretrial procedures are complete.51 Finally, it should be noted
that the most important function of pretrial transfer pursuant to
§1407 is for discovery of common issues of liability which, in the
case of asbestos, are no longer in contention.52
B. Rule 23 Class Action
Currently, the most promising method of mass claim disposition
available in the federal court system is that of the class action suit
established in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.53 Under this
provision, multiple claimants may file a single consolidated suit in
federal court rather than litigating each case separately.54 To receive
court certification under Rule 23, however, the class must meet
various requirements with respect to the types of issues,
to § 1407).
49 See In re Grand Funk Railroad Trademark Litigation, 371 F. Supp. 1084, 1085 U.P.M.L.
1974) (stating that transfer and consolidation pursuant to § 1407 would be denied where
actions contained only limited common questions and where discovery on common issues
was nearly complete); In re Pension Fund Class Action Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 1400, 1401
(J.P.M.L. 1973) (denying consolidation under § 1407 where petitioners failed to demonstrate
existence of common issues of law or fact among various suits).
50 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 39, at 506 (stating that §
1407 consolidation may only be used for pretrial purposes, limiting its utility for purposes of
mass tort claims); Tracy Schroth, Plan Would Consolidate Federal Asbestos Cases: Panel Seeks to
Streamline Process, N.J.L.J., June 6, 1991, at 5 (stating that transfer of asbestos cases by
multidistrict litigation panel would be handled by single court for pretrial purposes and then
remanded to their courts of origin for trial); Schultz, supra note 17, at 591-93 (noting limitation
of panel authority because asbestos cases filed in state court).
51 See Sherrill P. Hondorf, A Mandate for the Procedural Management of Mass Exposure
Litigation, 16 N. KY. L. REv. 541, 557 (1989) (arguing that purpose of consolidation is defeated
when cases must be remanded after conclusion of pretrial proceedings); Rhodes, supra note
47, at 714-15 (emphasizing that transfer is only for pretrial purposes); see also Sander Mazer
Moss, Response to Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute
from a State Judge's Perspective, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1573, 1574 (1995) (stating that for purposes of
discovery, consolidating tort claims on both state and federal level helps to expedite judicial
process).
52 See Gordon Hunter, Asbestos Supercase Is Born; Multidistrict Move One of Several, TEX.
LAw., Feb. 25, 1991 at I (stating that major common issues of liability and general causation
have been established through repeated litigation); see also Berman, supra note 22, at 93
(stating that asbestos makers may be held liable for harms from their products even if they
had no knowledge); Schultz, supra note 17, at 591-93.
53 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23; Charles S. McGowan, Jr. and Calvin C. Fayard, Jr., The Louisiana
Class Action, 58 LA. L. REv. 953, 954 (1998) (discussing importance of Rule 23 for class actions).
But see Jean F. Rydstrom, Propriety Under Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of Class
Action for Injuries in Airplane Crash, 28 A.L.R. FED. 719 (discussing inappropriateness of"mass
accident" for consolidation).
54 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(a).
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predominance of those issues, and adequacy of class
representation. 55
Certification under Rule 23 requires that the class be so numerous
that the participation of all of the parties would be impracticable. 56
This requirement would not be difficult to satisfy in the case of an
asbestos exposure class, given the sheer number of persons exposed
across the country. 57 This rule further mandates those common
questions of law or fact be pervasive throughout the class.5 8
Asbestos claimants generally allege exposure to products made by
the same manufacturers and they also assert that asbestos in general
has the capacity to cause various physical injuries. 59 Plaintiffs often
allege that the warnings accompanying asbestos-containing
products are inadequate to allow them to make an educated
decision regarding use of the products.60 It seems likely, therefore,
that a class of asbestos claimants would easily satisfy this element.
Certification for class action under this rule also requires that the
claims and defenses of the class representatives be typical of the
class as a whole.61 Rule 23 demands that the claims being presented
and litigated by the representatives are adequately developed,
55 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a) provides that a class action may be brought if: (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. Id.
56 FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a)(1).
57 See Ahearn v. Fibreboard, 162 F.R.D. 505, 523-24 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (stating that with class
membership numbering in hundreds of thousands, joinder of claims would be impracticable);
Jenkins v. Raymark, 782 F.2d 468, 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that millions of people had been
exposed to asbestos at work); Marc T. Kramer, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 749, 749 (1998)
(stating that asbestos litigation could include millions of plaintiffs); Schultz, supra note 17, at
561 (stating that asbestos cases pending on federal dockets may be as high as 100,000).
58 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2); Jenkins v. Rayinark, 782 F.2d at 472 (stating that rule requires
that resolution affect substantial number of class members); Ryan Kathleen Roth, Mass Tort
Malignancy: In the Search for a Cure, Courts Should Continue to Certifj Mandatory Settlement Only
Class Actions, 79 B.U. L. REV. 577, 587 (1999) (stating that commonality requirement focuses on
class as whole).
59 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that
whether asbestos fibers have capacity to cause physical injury is common question among
claimants); Schultz, supra note 17, at 561 (discussing increasing number of medical disorders
caused by asbestos exposure). But see Roth, supra note 58, at 592 (stating that claimants injuries
often range in severity).
60 See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626 (recognizing other common issues such as defendant's
knowledge of hazard posed by asbestos, adequacy of testing and warnings).
61 See FED. R. Cwv. P. 23(a)(3); Jenkins v. Rayinark, 782 F.2d at 471-72 (stating that if
plaintiffs have typical claims then attorneys will adequately represent them and that typicality
requirement focuses less on relative strengths of named and unnamed cases and more on
similarity of characteristics); Roth, supra note 58, at 588-89 (discussing "typicality
requirement").
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presenting essentially the same claims that would have been
presented and litigated by the individual member of the class had
they filed individually.62 This requirement is imposed to protect the
interests of the individual claimants who have waived their right to
present their case on an individual basis.63
Unfortunately, the claims of asbestos class members vary widely
since plaintiffs were usually exposed to different products, over
different periods of time, and in different ways.64 Additionally,
individual class members develop a broad spectrum of asbestos-
related injuries ranging from pleural disease to mesothelioma.65
Thus, it seems unlikely that a group of class representative plaintiffs
could assert all of the claims that would have been presented by the
individual class members.66
62 See FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a)(3); Jenkins v. Raymark, 782 F.2d at 472 (stating that adequacy
requirement looks at both class representatives and their counsel); Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 524
(discussing qualifications of counsel and representativeness of plaintiffs).
63 See Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997) (stating that adequacy-of-
representation requirement of Rule 23(a) serves to verify that interests of class members are
fairly and adequately protected in their absence); General Telephone Co. of Southwest v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 n.13 (1982) (explaining that adequacy-of-representation
requirement determines "whether the named plaintiffs claim and the class claims are so
interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in
their absence"); East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)
(recognizing that class representative must "possess the same interest and suffer the same
injury" as the class members); Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 39, at 477 (stating that this
requires that plaintiffs not be antagonistic at outset of litigation); Roth, supra note 58, at 596-97,
(stating that adequacy of representation is most important requirement because it justifies
substituting individual plaintiffs).
64 See Brenner, supra note 2, at 781 (stating that factual distinctions as to causation,
damages and defenses make it difficult to satisfy Rule 23 "typicality" requirement for class
certification); Deborah Deistch-Perez, Mechanical and Constitutional Problems in the Certification
of Mandatory Multistate Mass Tort Class Actions Under Rule 23, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 527-28
(1983) (stating that accidents occur in numerous ways).
65 See Brenner, supra note 2, at 784-87 (indicating that Rule 23 requirement of "adequacy of
representation" may not be met where plaintiffs present different stages and types of injuries
due to progressive nature of asbestos related diseases); Cramton, supra note 34, at 816
(recognizing that exposure histories of asbestos claimants may be distinctly different); Roth,
supra note 58, at 492 (stating that severity of injuries suffered by claimants vary across broad
range).
66 See Ainchem, 521 U.S. at 609-10 (stating that asbestos claimants that have been exposed
to different products, in different ways and over different periods of time with resulting
variations manifests disease); see also G. Donald Puckett, Peering Into a Black Box: Discovery and
Adequate Attorney Representation for Class Action Settlements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1271, 1288 (1999)
(this requirement is intended to ensure cohesion among class so that representatives will
represent class members' interests as well as their own); Roth, supra note 58, at 596 (considered
procedural hurdle for many class representation cases, requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) ensure
that traditional notions of due process are fulfilled and substituting individual participation in
judicial process is justified); Burt M. Rublin, Class Action Case, Denise L. Rowland v. American
General Consumer Discount Company, 1113 PLI/CORP. 31, 31 (1999) (noting typicality
requirement overlaps with requirement that interests of class be adequately protected).
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III. EFFORTS AT COLLECTIVE RESOLUTION OF THE ASBESTOS PROBLEM
In 1990, after examining the asbestos situation, a United States
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation
recommended that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transfer and consolidate all pending federal asbestos suits to a single
district for pretrial proceedings. 67 The MDL panel transferred all
pending federal cases to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.68 After the consolidation, attorneys
reached a settlement agreement disposing of all pending and future
claims against the defendant companies. 69 To effectuate the
settlement, all of the transferee claimants jointly filed a class action
in the name of Robert Georgine as class representative pursuant to
Rule 23.70
District Judge Weiner certified the class for settlement purposes,
finding that the requirements for class certification under Rule 23
had been satisfied.71 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
this holding, stating that the class could neither satisfy Rule 23(a)
requirements of typicality and adequacy of representation, nor Rule
23(b) requirements of predominance and superiority. 72 Circuit Judge
Becker reasoned that the individual claims of the class members
were too unique to satisfy class certification requirements. 73
67 See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., No. VI, 771 F. Supp. 415, 418-19 (.P.M.L. 1991)
(discussing report from Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos recommending
consolidation of all federal asbestos suits). See generally Davis, supra note 25, at 163 n.28
(discussing Judicial Conference Ad Hoc committee and recommendation regarding
consolidation of federal asbestos suits); W. O'Leary, Mass Tort Class Actions: Will Ainchein
Spawn Creative Solutions?, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 469,469 (1998).
68 See In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig., No. VI, 771 F. Supp. at 419 (ordering transfer of all
pending federal asbestos suits to Eastern District of Pennsylvania for pretrial proceedings); see
also O'Leary, supra note 67, at 469.
69 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 620-21 (3d Cir. 1996). The Georgine
class settlement provided for settlement of all present and future claims for personal injury or
wrongful death against twenty separate defendant companies known collectively as the
Center for Claims Resolution. Id.
70 See Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (granting
provisional certification to settlement class).
71 See George v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 257 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (granting final
certification of Georgine settlement dass). See generally Michael P. Malakoff and Erin M. Brady,
Taming the Unconnon Issue: What Role Should Subclasses Play in Rule 23(B)(3) Certifications?, 772
PLI/CoMM 329, 333 (1998) (summarizing procedural history).
72 See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 634 (reversing certification of settlement class); see also Roth,
supra note 58, at 585.
73 See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 627. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997),
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Judge Becker's order decertifying the Georgine class on the
grounds that it failed to meet the Rule 23 requirements of predominance and adequacy of
representation. The Amchem Court further noted that such a class certification would also
present questions regarding the adequacy of notice to future claimants. Id at 629.
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A similar class was certified for settlement purposes in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in Ahearn v.
Fibreboard.74 There, the District Court certified a class for mandatory
global settlement under rule 23(b) on the grounds that the
settlement created a limited fund and that a mandatory class action
was appropriate to protect the interests of future clairnants.75 The
Fifth Circuit upheld the settlement class certification on the limited
fund grounds both on initial appeal76 and on remand. 77
In Ortiz v. Fibreboard,78 the United States Supreme Court struck
down the Fifth Circuit's certification of the Ahearn class on the
grounds that it failed to meet the "limited fund" requirement of Rule
23(b).79 The court reasoned that the limited fund in question was
limited only by the settlement agreement itself, and not by some
independent source or circumstance which would otherwise require
the use of such a mandatory class action.8 0 In reaching its
74 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
75 See Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 530 (stating that class satisfied all requirements of Rule 23(b)
and should be certified for settlement purposes); see also Jeremy Gaston, Standing on its Head:
The Problem of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 TEX. L. REV. 215, 216 n.9 (1998)
(discussing certification of Ahearn settlement class on "limited fund" basis); Todd W. Latz, Awho
Can Tell the Futures? Protecting Settlement Class Action Members Without Notice, 85 VA. L. REV.
531, 552-53 (1999) (discussing "limited fund" certification granted Ahearn settlement class in
District Court); Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims:
Comparison of Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV.
405, 442 (1999) (noting that in Ahearn judge appointed guardian ad litem to insure there would
be no conflict between future claimants and claimants with cases pending).
76 See In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d 963, 974, 991-93 (1996) (affirming certification of
Ahearn class on initial appeal from District Court); see also Donald C. Massey, Louis C. LaCour,
Jr., & Valerie M. Sercovich, Curtailing the Tidal Surge: Current Reforms in Louisiana Class Action
Law, 44 LOY. L. REV. 7 n.99 (1998); George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of
Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 556 (1997) (noting that Ahearn settlement class
was certified by 5th Circuit Court of Appeals because guardian ad litem was appointed by
District Court to protect interests of future claimants).
77 See 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (remanding original petition for certiorari to Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals for reconsideration of class certification in light of Windsor decision); Flanagan v.
Aheam, 134 F.3d 668 (1998) (reaffirming certification of Ahearn class following remand from
U.S. Supreme Court).
78 527 U.S. 815 (1999); see also Marc A. Yaggi, The U.S. Supreme Court's 1998-1999 Term, 29
ENVTL. L. REP. 10610, 10615 (1999).
79 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815, 863 (stating that record demonstrated that certain exclusions
from class and treatment of specific assets were at odds with concept of limited fund
treatment under 23(b) as well as structural protections of Rule 23(a)).
80 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(e) (stating that fairness of settlement does not dispense with
requirements of subdivisions (a)(b)); Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815, 863 (stating that such limited fund
must be shown to be limited independently of agreement of parties to action); In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that settlements
creating limited funds where company facing liability provides only de minimus contribution
may create incentives for company to undermine protections of creditors built into
Bankruptcy Code). See generally H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE, CLASS ACTIONS 4.01, 4-6 (3rd ed.
1992) (explaining use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in mandatory limited fund class actions); William W.
Schwarzer, Strncturing Multiclaim Litigation: Should Rule 23 Be Revised, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1250,
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conclusion, the Court further noted that such a fund must still meet
the stringent requirements of Rule 23.81
After examining the settlement class actions proposed under Rule
23 in Georgine and Ahearn, it is clear that there are several problems
with using Rule 23 to resolve the ongoing asbestos crisis. The
Supreme Court stated in both Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor82 and
Ortiz that the settlement classes failed to satisfy the threshold
requirements of predominance and adequacy of representation.83
Additionally, the Court in Ortiz determined that Rule 23(b)
requirements of "limited fund" could not be met in a case of a global
settlement such as the one proposed in Ahearn.84 Thus, it seems
highly unlikely that an asbestos class could ever satisfy the
burdensome requirements of Rule 23.
IV. A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
Congress has finally taken steps to resolve the asbestos litigation
crisis by proposing The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act.85
This legislation strikes a balance between the public interest in
exacting full compensation from the manufacturers of asbestos
products86 and the social necessity of preserving something for
1257 (1996) (discussing factors to consider in use of Rule 23 in mass-tort litigations).
81 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831-32 (noting that in certifying Ahearn class, Fifth Circuit failed to
give due attention to requirements of 23(a) in light of Windsor); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622-28 (1997) (holding that Georgine class cannot satisfy either
predominance or adequacy or representation requirements of Rule 23); Dickinson v.
Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1952) (noting that in securities class action definiteness
of fund, as well as Rule 23(a) requirements, are important for court to consider in certifying
class).
82 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
83 See Windsor, 521 U.S. at 622, 628 (holding that Georgine class could not satisfy either
predominance or adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831-
08 (declaring that on remand, Fifth Circuit failed to adhere to ruling in Ainchein regarding
Rule 23(a) requirements).
84 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 844-45 (stating that it is clear that drafters of Rule 23(b) did not
contemplate use of limited fund mandatory class action to aggregate unliquidated tort claims
on limited fund rationale); Monaghan, Antitrust Injunctions and Preclusions Against Absent Non-
Resident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1164 (1998) (stating that draftsmen did not
intend emerging expansive interpretations of Rule 23 (b)(1)(B) , which allow Rule to be
functional equivalent to bankruptcy by embracing "funds" created by litigation itself); see also
Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
858, 877 (1995) (considering effects of Rule 23 on state tort law with respect to Erie's doctrinal
concerns); William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 837, 840 (1995) (noting that original concept of limited fund class does not fit
situation where large number of claims might eventually result in judgements that in
aggregate could exceed assets available to satisfy them).
85 H.R. 1283,106th Cong. (1999).
86 See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 1, at 323 (stating that role of courts "has been to
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future claimants who have not yet developed any illness related to
asbestos.87 It is virtually conceded that unless Congress takes some
action to protect the interests of future claimants, shortly no viable,
non-bankrupt company will remain to compensate those who are
not yet sick.88 Where necessary in the past Congress has stepped in
to create an equitable solution in situations involving mass tort
liability, often enacting legislation balancing the rights of
individuals against the greater public good.89
As a threshold matter, this statute would modify the rights of
individual asbestos claimants by removing all asbestos-related
personal injury claims currently pending in every court in America
from the traditional court system90 and barring any future filings
without prior certification from the Corporation.91 This represents a
significant inroad into the fundamental principles of federalism
where states traditionally have maintained their individual
sovereign police powers to regulate tort law.92 It is very likely,
protect the injured who come before them against those who have caused ... unjustified
harm").
87 See H.R. 1283 at § 2 (finding that current litigation system awards massive amounts to
few claimants while threatening ability of future claimants to obtain compensation); Jackson
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1329 (5th Cir. 1985) (Clark, C.J., dissenting) (voicing
his concern that those who litigate first will exhaust all assets available to compensate injured
parties, leaving nothing to compensate future claimants). See generally Dutcher, supra note 26,
at 958 (stating that courts must be conscious of interests of future claimants or current damage
awards and costs will exhaust corporate assets of defendant companies); Miller & Ainsworth,
supra note 27, at 425 (recognizing danger of depleting assets available to compensate future
claimants).
88 See H.R. 1283 at § 2(2) (finding that asbestos litigation has already forced great majority
of asbestos industry into bankruptcy); see, e.g., Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710,
710 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (resolving bankruptcy petition of Eagle-Picher Industries,
Inc.); In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. 973, 973 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (filing of
bankruptcy petition by Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 45 B.R. 322, 322
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (filing of bankruptcy petition by UNR Industries, Inc.); In re Amatex, 37
B.R. 613,613 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (filing of bankruptcy petition by Amatex).
89 See, e.g., Black Lung Benefits Act § 922, 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1969) (establishing statutory
compensation scheme for victims of coal dust exposure); National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act §§ 300aa-10, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 (1986) (establishing national compensation system for
children injured through vaccination).
90 See H.R. 1283 at §§ 701-02. This provision would apply to "any civil action asserting an
asbestos claim that has not resulted in a final, non-appealable judgement" as of the date of
enactment. Id. at § 701.
91 See H.R. 1283 § 401. This provision would bar filing of any asbestos personal injury suit
in any court without obtaining a certificate of medical eligibility from the Corporation
pursuant to § 205. Id. at § 401.
92 See Finding Solutions to the Asbestos Litigation Problem, 1999: Hearing on S. 758 Before the
Subcomn. On Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 106"
Cong. (Oct. 6,1999) (statement of Richard Middleton, Jr., President, Assoc. of Trial Lawyers of
America) (arguing that FACA provisions which modify existing state tort law and eliminate
claimants' rights to seek compensation through traditional tort system create serious Tenth
Amendment problems). But see The Fairness in Asbestos Coipensation Act, 1999: Hearings on S.
76 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
however, that Congress does maintain the constitutional authority
to regulate the nationwide disposition of asbestos suits under
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution which grants Congress the
broad power to regulate interstate commerce.93
The medical eligibility provisions further reduce the options
available to claimants by eliminating a claimant's legal right to file
suit unless physically impaired or suffering an accepted
malignancy.94 By contrast, many individuals who would not meet
the medical certification criteria established by FACA would be
eligible for compensation under applicable state tort law.95
Although this may seem like a great sacrifice, the class settlement
agreement proposed and accepted by the Georgine plaintiff class
contained a similar disease catagorization scheme. 96 Finally, those
claimants who do meet the eligibility criteria for filing a claim with
the Corporation will not be able to recover punitive damages, 97
damages for emotional distress 98 or for increased risk of cancer or
other asbestos related disease.99 This too may seem like quite a
sacrifice for claimants, however, the class settlement agreement
accepted by the plaintiff class in Ortiz contained a similar provision
barring punitive damages and prejudgment interest while also
placing a cap on each claimant's total possible recovery.100
Under most state tort laws, in order to preserve a cause of action,
758 Before the Subcomm. On Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. On the
Judicianj, 106th Cong. (Oct. 5, 1999) (statement of Paul R. Verkuil, Dean and Professor of Law,
Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School) (arguing that FACA's modifications of state law are
"consistent with principles of federalism enshrined in the Tenth Amendment and with the
substantive due process rights of claimants").
93 See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941) (stating that Congress has broad discretion to
regulate those activities which "have a substantial effect on commerce"); Nat'l Labor Relations
Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (noting that Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce is plenary with freedom to enact any legislation which is
appropriate to protect and advance it; see also Verkuil, supra note 92, at 1 (arguing that
regulation of asbestos litigation through enactment of FACA is within Congress' commerce
clause powers).
94 See H.R. 1283 at §§ 201-205.
95 See Middleton, snpra note 92, (stating that adoption of medical criteria established by
FACA would do great injustice to many claimants who have been injured but do not meet
heightened medical standards of Act).
96 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 603-04 (1997) (noting that
settlement agreement stipulated payment schedule based on four similar disease categories
requiring medical documentation).
97 See H.R. 1283 at § 501(4).
98 See H.R. 1283 at § 501(2).
99 See H.R. 1283 at § 501(3).
100 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815, 825 (1999) (stating that under settlement plan, if
claimant contested settlement offer following mediation, punitive damages and prejudgment
interest would be unavailable at trial).
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individuals who have been injured from a defective product must
file suit before the applicable statute of limitations expires, whether
disabled or not.101 As a result, a large majority of asbestos claimants
who have filed suit in the court system are exposure-only claimants
with no disability or serious illness.102 Under this statute, however,
the statute of limitations would no longer apply to asbestos personal
injury cases.103
Claimants under this Act would also benefit from a structured
system for the expedient resolution of all claims meeting the
certification requirements. 104 In the current tort system asbestos
litigation delays often stretch beyond three years.OS In addition,
legal costs absorb a large portion of any recovery a claimant may
eventually receive.106 Under the provisions of FACA, once a claim is
certified the parties are ushered through a series of ADR
mechanisms until either a settlement is reached or all ADR options
have been exhausted.107 Unlike that of traditional litigation, the
101 See The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act, 1999: Hearings on S.758 Before the
Subcommn. On Administrative Oversight and the Conrts of the Comm. On the Judiciary, 106th Cong.,
(Oct. 6, 1999) (statement of Christopher Edley Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School) (stating that
many asbestos claimants sue because they must to avoid statute of limitations even where no
impairment suffered).
102 See Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 631-32 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that up to
one-half of asbestos claims are filed by claimants with little or no physical impairment).
103 See H.R. 1283 § 502 which states:
No defense to an asbestos claim based on a statute of limitations or statute of repose,
laches, or any other defense based on the timeliness of the claim shall be recognized or
allowed in any civil action or arbitration unless such claim was untimely as of the date of
enactment of this Act.
Id.
104 See H.R. 1283 at §§ 101-208. This legislation would establish a mandatory settlement
mechanism through which all accepted claims would be required to progress before such
claims may be filed in the traditional court system. As a threshold matter, the Act would
establish the minimum medical standards required for acceptance of all asbestos-related
personal injury claims. Id.
105 See Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, Report of the Ad
Hoc Committee (1991) (stating that asbestos cases take an inordinately long time to reach
disposition); H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (finding that "volume and complexity of
asbestos cases have resulted in the violation of basic tenet of American justice: speedy and
inexpensive resolution of cases."). See generally Dutcher, supra note 17, at 957 (discussing
customary delays associated with asbestos suits); Hensler & Peterson, supra note 5, at 963
(discussing problems facing asbestos claimants in current judicial system).
106 See Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, Report of the Ad
Hoc Committee (1991) (recognizing that asbestos litigation has proven to be extraordinarily
costly); H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (finding that attorney's fees and litigation costs leave
less than 50 percent of total cost of asbestos litigation to compensate claimants); see also
Schultz, snpra note 7, at 562 (discussing high cost of asbestos litigation). See generally JAMES S.
KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION, COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 91 (1984)
(discussing high costs of asbestos litigation).
107 See H.R. 1283 at §§ 301-306.
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timetable for implementation of ADR under FACA would be
considerably shorter, imposing mandatory mediation to begin
within 60 days of acceptance of the claim' 08 and setting the same
time limit for completion of mediation.109 The statute also provides
for establishment of similar time restrictions on the arbitration
process.110
CONCLUSION
The asbestos crisis has severely impaired the traditional tort
system in this country. Between awards obtained by exposure-only
claimants with no demonstrable impairment and punitive damage
awards which often dwarf their compensatory counterparts,
resources for compensating those who will become sick in the future
are in serious danger of becoming depleted. Courts have made
creative use of the currently existing extra-judicial methods of case
aggregation and disposition with little or no success, finally
imploring Congress to create a solution. After many years,
Congress has responded with a proposal that would strike a balance
between the rights of those already injured to seek redress in a court
of law and those who, absent some legislative intervention, may
never get the opportunity. The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation
Act would provide the most equitable and most cost-effective
solution to this ongoing saga and should be made law.
Jody L. Gallegos*
108 See H.R. 1283 at § 304.
109 See H.R. 1283 at § 305(c) (mandating that mediation be completed within 60 days of
commencement).
110 See H.R. 1283 at § 306 (mandating that claimant serve notice of election to arbitrate
upon defendants within thirty days of termination of mediation).
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